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Recent models with liquidity constraints and impatience emphasize that consumers use savings to buffer income 
fluctuations. When wealth is below an optimal target, consumers try to increase their buffer stock of wealth by 
saving more, while, if wealth is above target, they increase consumption. This important implication of the 
buffer stock model of saving has not been subject to direct empirical testing. We derive from the model an 
appropriate theoretical restriction and test it using data on working-age individuals drawn from the 2002 Italian 
Survey of Household Income and Wealth. One of the most appealing features of the survey is that respondents 
report the amount of wealth held for precautionary purposes, which we interpret as target wealth in a buffer stock 
model. The test results do not support buffer stock behavior, even among population groups that are more likely, 
a priori, to display such behavior. The saving behavior of young households is instead consistent with models in 
which impatience, relative to prudence, is not as high as in buffer stock models. 
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   1 Introduction
Recent intertemporal consumption models with impatient individuals emphasize
t h er o l eo fs a v i n g sa sab u ﬀer stock against income ﬂuctuations. Deaton (1991) and
Carroll (1992, 1997) have solved sophisticated versions of such models. Although the
speciﬁcd e t a i l so ft h em o d e l sd i ﬀer, emphasizing liquidity constraints or the prob-
ability of low income realizations, they share similar predictions. In both models,
consumers have a unique and stable wealth to permanent income ratio (what we
term the target wealth-income ratio). This implies that people who have received
negative income shocks, and whose wealth is consequently below target, intend to
be “savers”, and thus increase their stock of wealth. People who have received pos-
itive shocks, and whose wealth is therefore above target, intend to be “dissavers”,
increasing current consumption and running down their stock of wealth.
This key implication of the buﬀer-stock saving model has not been subject to
empirical scrutiny because target wealth is unobservable. Current evidence of buﬀer-
stock behavior is based on two model’s implications: that consumption tracks income
closely, and that precautionary saving represents an important reason for wealth accu-
mulation. Several simulations of intertemporal consumption models predict consumption-
income tracking in the early part of the life-cycle (Attanasio, Banks, Meghir, and
Weber, 1999; Laibson, Repetto and Tobacman, 1998; Gourinchas and Parker, 2002;
Cagetti, 2003). Empirical evidence on the importance of precautionary saving is
mostly based on reduced form regressions of net worth or ﬁnancial assets on proxies
for income risk. Some studies report that precautionary wealth represents a small
portion of total wealth, e.g. Guiso, Jappelli and Terlizzese (1992), and Hurst, Ken-
nickel, Lusardi and Torralba (2005); others ﬁnd a large impact of income risk, Carroll
and Samwick (1997), and Gruber and Yelowitz (1999). These studies diﬀer in many
respects, such as the deﬁnition of wealth, the measure of risk, and institutional fea-
tures. But even ﬁndings of large eﬀects of income risk on saving are not conclusive
evidence of buﬀer stock behavior, because life-cycle models with income risk also pro-
vide an important role for precautionary saving, see Hubbard, Skinner, and Zeldes
2(1995). In short, the literature still lacks a convincing test of the buﬀer-stock model.
In this paper we use a survey question on precautionary wealth available in the
2002 Bank of Italy Survey on Household Income and Wealth (SHIW) to propose a
direct test of buﬀer stock behavior. The question asks people how much savings
they think they need for future emergencies, and is similar to a question contained
in the 1995 and 1998 Surveys of Consumer Finances described in Kennickell and
Lusardi (2004). We interpret this question as providing information on target wealth
in a buﬀer-stock model, and test the proposition that people with wealth-income ratio
below target expect to save, while those with wealth-income ratio above target expect
to dissave.
We show that the main testable implication of the buﬀer stock model is that the
covariance between the wealth gap (the diﬀerence between actual and target wealth)
and consumption is (strongly) positive. Although we focus on Carroll’s version of
the buﬀer stock model, the test applies equally well to Deaton’s case. In Carroll,
buﬀer stock behavior emerges from the tension between impatience, prudence, and the
chance of zero earnings. Impatient individuals would like to anticipate consumption,
but the chance of zero future earnings generates a demand for wealth. In Deaton, the
tension is between impatience, prudence, and liquidity constraints, but the insights
are similar, and buﬀer stock behavior emerges again as the optimal policy.
Realistic versions of the buﬀer stock model with ﬁnite horizons and declining in-
come after retirement limit considerably the age-range of buﬀer stock behavior. Car-
roll (1997) shows that buﬀer stock behavior emerges until roughly age 50, and that
afterwards people start to accumulate wealth steadily to prepare for retirement. Other
models of intertemporal choice deliver diﬀerent predictions about the correlation be-
tween income and consumption and the age-wealth proﬁle during the life-cycle. In the
standard life-cycle model without uncertainty, the individual wealth-income ratio is
not stationary because consumers save each year until retirement. Hubbard, Skinner
and Zeldes (1995) use numerical methods to analyze the properties of a more sophisti-
cated life-cycle model with life uncertainty and income risk; their simulations report,
3on average, substantial accumulation even at young age. Laibson, Repetto and To-
bacman (1998), Attanasio, Banks, Meghir, and Weber (1999), Gourinchas and Parker
(2002) and Cagetti (2003) provide structural estimates of stochastic dynamic models
of consumption, matching theoretical and observed statistics for US households, and
ﬁnd a close association between income and consumption in the early part of the life-
cycle, and therefore little wealth accumulation at young age, and more substantial
wealth accumulation near retirement age. The ﬁnal part of the paper therefore uses
estimates of the age-wealth proﬁle obtained with Italian repeated cross-sectional data
to strike a balance between buﬀer-stock and life-cycle saving behavior.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the buﬀer stock
saving model, presents the empirical test, based on the stationarity of the target
wealth-to-income ratio, and computes the test statistics on data simulated from a re-
alistic parametrization of the model. Section 3 describes the survey question on target
wealth, and compares it with a similar question asked in the Survey of Consumer Fi-
nances. Section 4 presents the test results. Our ﬁndings suggest absence of signiﬁcant
correlation between the wealth gap and consumption and are thus not consistent with
the buﬀer stock model, regardless of the particular deﬁnition of wealth used (real or
ﬁnancial). We then explore if buﬀer-stock saving emerges in some population groups
that, a priori, are expected to follow buﬀer stock behavior (the self-employed, the
young, and those who face higher income risk). We also split the sample using direct
information on the individual rate of time preference available in the 2000 SHIW,
which can be merged with the panel section of the 2002 SHIW. Finally, we check
the robustness of the test when consumption, cash-on-hand, and target wealth are
measured with error. Section 5 uses as organizing framework estimates of the age pro-
ﬁle of the wealth-income ratio to explore further if the buﬀer stock model is able to
explain the saving decisions of young households. Section 6 summarizes our ﬁndings.
42 Deriving testable implications of buﬀer stock be-
havior
We take as our point of departure Carroll’s (1992) buﬀer-stock saving model to de-
rive testable predictions and explain our empirical strategy. Consumers have ﬁnite






where β is the subjective discount factor, the instantaneous utility function is isoelas-
tic, u(Ct)=C
1−ρ
t /(1 − ρ),a n dρ>0 is the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion. The
dynamic budget constraint is:
Wt+1 = R[Wt − Ct + Yt]
where R =1+r is the constant interest rate factor, and Wt, Yt,a n dCt are, respec-
tively, non-human wealth, labor income, and consumption at time t .L a b o ri n c o m e




where G i st h eg r o w t hr a t eo fi n c o m e ,Pt+1 is permanent income, and Vt+1 and Nt+1
are i.i.d. shocks with mean equal to 1. The model also assumes that in each period
there is a small chance p>0 that transitory income is zero. The Bellman equation
of the problem is:
Vt(Wt,P t)=m a x
Ct
{u(Ct)+βEtVt+1(Wt+1,P t+1)} (1)
s.t. Pt+1 = GPtNt+1
Wt+1 = R[Wt − Ct + Yt]
5To exploit the homogeneity of the instantaneous utility function, let’s deﬁne cash-












where xt = Wt+Yt
Pt , ct = Ct
Pt and vt(xt)=Vt(Wt,Y t)/P
1−ρ
t .
Carroll (2004) shows that for speciﬁc ranges of parameter values, the problem has
a solution (i.e., the functional deﬁn e di n2h a saﬁxed point), optimal consumption is
an increasing and concave function of cash-on-hand, and the marginal propensity to
consume out of cash-on-hand is bounded from above and from below. Furthermore,
t h e r ee x i s t sau n i q u ea n ds t a b l ec a s h - on-hand-to-permanent income ratio x∗ such that,
“if actual cash-on-hand is greater than the target, impatience will outweigh prudence,
and wealth will fall, while if cash-on-hand is below the target, the precautionary
saving motive will outweigh impatience and the consumer will try to build wealth
back up toward to target” (Carroll, 2001, p. 33).1 In our notation, if (xt − x∗) < 0,
then the cash-on-hand to permanent income ratio grows in expectation. If instead
(xt −x∗) > 0, xt falls (again, in expectation). Using cross-sectional data, we test this
key implication of the model.
At any given point in time, households diﬀer in their value of the wealth gap
(xt − x∗).Aﬁrst source of heterogeneity concerns preferences and the parameters of
the income generating process, which set diﬀerent values of x∗ for each individual.
Income shocks are a second source of heterogeneity: even if two identical consumers
have the same preferences and the same income generating process - and therefore
the same x∗ - they receive diﬀerent income shocks and have therefore diﬀerent xt and
wealth gaps.2
1Carroll (2004) shows also that, at the target, expected consumption growth is less than expected
permanent income growth; and that expected consumption growth is declining in cash-on-hand.
2These are not the only possible sources of heterogeneity. In Section 2.2 we use simulation analysis
to explore the eﬀect of heterogeneity in income risk, income growth, and interest rates.
6Thus in a cross-section, the implication we test is that:
COV(xht − x
∗
h,E ht(xht+1 − xht)) < 0 (4)
where COV (.,.) is a population covariance and h is a household index. This notation
m a k e se x p l i c i tt h a tEht(xht+1 − xht) is the time t expectation of household h’s next
period change in cash-on-hand, and the covariance is taken with respect to the cross-
sectional distribution of the wealth gap and of expected asset accumulation.
To test this restriction one needs to observe x∗
h, xht and Eht(xht+1).A sw es h a l l
see, we have data on actual wealth and on a proxy of target wealth, but not on
the expected value of the change in cash-on-hand. To evaluate Eht(xt+1),l e t ’ st a k e
the expectation as of time t of (3) for household h,a n dr e c a l lt h a tEht(Nt+1)=1 ,
Eht(Vt+1)=1 ,a n dVA R ht(lnNt+1)=σ2
N:









[xht − cht] ∗ e
σ2
N +1 (5)
where the second equality follows from a second order Taylor expansion of 1
Nht+1around
the mean of Nht+1.
Substituting (5) in (4) and deﬁning γ = eσ2














The right-hand-side of the inequality (6) is positive, because σN > 0 implies γ>1,
while the condition G<Rguarantees a ﬁnite present discounted value of income.
According to the model, the left-hand-side should therefore be positive. Intuitively,
people above target have a relatively high consumption to permanent income ratio
(and vice versa). As we shall see below, the proposed test has a simple instrumental-
variable interpretation, which delivers further interesting insights.
3Equation (6) is the relevant condition only if COV(xht − x∗
h,x ht) > 0. Since this is what holds
in the data, it is the only case we examine.
72.1 Test interpretation














h) − (xh − x∗
h))(xh − xh)
where cov(.,.) is a sample covariance and a bar over a variable denotes its cross-
sectional mean. The same expression can be obtained from an (exactly identiﬁed) IV
regression of ch on xh using (xh − x∗
h) as an instrument. This suggests running the
following regression:
ch = η + θxh + uh (7)
using the wealth gap as an instrument for x, and testing the null hypothesis that θ,
which from now on we term the covariance ratio, equals zero. A ﬁnding that θ ≤ 0 is
unambiguously inconsistent with the buﬀer stock model. But θ>0 might still reject











Consider ﬁrst the case G =1(no productivity growth), and note that in the
absence of uncertainty (σ2
N =0 ,o rγ =1 ), or in models with quadratic preferences in
which consumers do not react to uncertainty, the marginal propensity to consume out








1+r.4 As income uncertainty







=1 . Allowing for
productivity growth (G>1) has the opposite eﬀe c t ,b e c a u s ea ni n c r e a s ei nG reduces
the MPC.
To provide realistic and operative bounds for the test and the value of the marginal
propensity to consume, one needs speciﬁc values for the model parameters. Carroll
(2001) proposes an interest rate equal to 4 percent per year, 3 percent productivity
growth rate, and a standard deviation of permanent income shocks of 0.10, corre-






=0 .019. Parameters for the Italian economy provide a slightly
higher value. On average, in the past two decades the productivity growth rates
of Italian workers in the age group (20-50) has been 1.5 percent per year. Jappelli
and Pistaferri (2006) estimate with panel data that the standard deviation of per-
manent income shocks is 0.16. Assuming that the interest rate is 2.5 percent, raises
the reference wealth coeﬃcient in equation (7) to 3.6 percent. Therefore, values of
the estimated covariance ratio b θ ≥ 0.036 are potentially consistent with buﬀer stock
behavior.
2.2 The simulated covariance ratio
The empirical test of the previous section compares the estimated covariance ratio b θ
with the lower bound of the distribution of θ under the hypothesis that the model
is true. However, to have a better grasp of the empirical results, one should be able
to answer the question: How large should θ be in a buﬀer stock model? This value
depends on the speciﬁca s s u m p t i o n so n em a k e sa b o u tt h ep a r a m e t e r so ft h em o d e l
a n di tm i g h tb ev e r yf a rf r o mt h el o w e rb o u n dd e r i v e da b o v e .
To answer this question, we simulate the model for an economy populated by
heterogeneous consumers, compute the wealth gap for each, and compute the cross-
sectional covariance ratio θ. In the baseline simulation, we assume that the interest
rate is 2.5 percent, the growth rate of permanent income 1.5 percent, the probability of
zero income 0.5 percent, and the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion 2. Permanent and
transitory income shocks are drawn from lognormal distributions with mean equal to
1 and standard deviation equal to 0.16 and 0.28, respectively (Jappelli and Pistaferri,
2006). Consumers diﬀer because the discount factor is uniformly distributed between
0.86 and 0.96, and because, at any given point in time, they are hit by diﬀerent
income shocks. We further assume that consumers start with zero wealth.
The optimal consumption function is a structural relation between the ratio of
consumption to permanent income and the ratio of cash-on-hand and permanent in-
come. As shown in Carroll (2004), the function is bounded from below and from
9above, and so is its derivative. Moreover, it is increasing and concave. The con-
sumption function is usually found by solving the model numerically. Here, instead,
we use an approximate consumption function:
ct =2 ( κ − κ){xt −
1
b
[log(1 + exp(bxt)) − log(2)]} + κxt
where








and R,β, ρ,a n dp are deﬁn e di nS e c t i o n2a n db =1 .02. Carroll (2004) derives the
expressions of κ and κ, while Padula (2005) proposes this approximate consumption
function and documents its properties. For the baseline case, the correlation coeﬃ-
cient between the numerical solution and the analytical approximation is 0.96, and
is robust to a wide range of admissible parameter values. Figure 1 plots income and
consumption to permanent income ratios for a typical consumer. The ﬁgure shows
that consumption is smoother than income, and that large income shocks produce
less pronounced consumption changes, as in standard buﬀer stock models.
Using the analytical approximation and the budget constraint, and assuming that
consumers start with zero wealth, we simulate the model for 100 periods and 1,000
consumers. We then compute, for each consumer, target wealth as the ratio between
cash-on-hand and permanent income such that Etxt+1 = xt.T oc a l c u l a t eθ we com-
pute the covariance ratios at each point in time and then average them across the
100 periods. For the baseline experiment we ﬁnd θ =0 .3995, an order of magnitude
larger than the 0.036 lower bound obtained for the same set of parameter values.
This value is remarkably close to the covariance ratio computed solving the model
numerically (θ =0 .3965), which we interpret as further conﬁrmation of the validity
of the approximate consumption function.
We also compute the covariance ratio under very diﬀerent assumptions about
the source of heterogeneity in the model. We allow for heterogeneity in the growth
10rate of income, interest rate, permanent income shocks (and various combinations
of heterogeneity sources), and ﬁnd that the covariance ranges from 0.20 to 0.43.5
Overall, the simulation results suggest that realistic values of the covariance ratios lie
much above the theoretical threshold.
3D a t a
To implement the empirical test of the buﬀer stock model, we use the 2002 Italian
Survey of Household Income and Wealth (SHIW), a biannual representative sample
of the Italian population conducted by the Bank of Italy.6 The sample includes about
8,000 households and 24,000 individuals. Details on questionnaire, sample design,
response rates, results and comparison of survey data with macroeconomic data are
given in Biancotti et al. (2004).
For our purposes, the SHIW has several advantages. It has data on wealth, in-
come, consumption, and detailed demographic characteristics of the household. Net
ﬁnancial assets measure the liquid portion of wealth, and are the sum of transaction
accounts, government bonds, CDs, corporate bonds, retirement accounts, life insur-
ance, and stocks, less household debt (mortgage loans, consumer credit and other
personal loans). Total assets are the sum of net ﬁnancial assets and real assets (real
estate, unincorporated business holdings, valuables and art objects). The SHIW also
includes a rotating panel component: 45 percent of the households interviewed in
2002 were also interviewed two years before. We will later use the panel section of
the SHIW to recover individual-level variables available only in the 2000 survey.
Most importantly for the present study, the 2002 SHIW has a direct question
5We consider cases in which the growth rates of income are uniformly distributed between 1 and
2 percent, interest rates between 2 to 3 percent, and standard deviation of permanent income shocks
between 10 to 20 percent. All these results are available on request.
6In the buﬀer stock model, the marginal propensity to consume is high because consumers are
impatient. Carroll (2001) interprets the excess sensitivity of consumption found by Campbell and
Mankiw (1991) and Jappelli and Pagano (1989) in time series data for several OECD countries, and
in Italy in particular, as dependent on the prevalence of impatient households. He argues that in
these countries there are “more households who are impatient and consequently inhabit the portion
of the consumption function where the MPC is high, whether they are formally constrained or not”
(Carroll, 2001). Italy, therefore, provides a good testing ground for the buﬀer-stock model.
11on precautionary wealth, which we use to proxy target wealth in the buﬀer stock
model: “People save in various ways (depositing money in a bank account, buying
ﬁnancial assets, property, or other assets) and for diﬀerent reasons. A ﬁrst reason is to
prepare for a planned event, such as the purchase of a house, children’s education, etc.
Another reason is to protect against contingencies, such as uncertainty about future
earnings or unexpected outlays (owing to health problems or other emergencies).
About how much do you think you and your family need to have in savings to meet
such unexpected events?” The question is patterned after a similar question in the
Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF), described in Kennickell and Lusardi (2004).7
Table 1 reports sample means and quartiles of target wealth for various sample
groups. The median value of target wealth is euro 25,000, and the mean is euro
49,990. Interestingly, these values are higher than in the U.S., where Kennickell and
L u s a r d i( 2 0 0 4 )r e p o r tt h a tt h eb u l ko ft h ed i s t r i b u t i o no ft a r g e tw e a l t hi sb e t w e e n
$5,000 and $10,000. Target wealth is higher among high-school and college graduates,
self-employed, households with multiple income recipients, and households living in
the North. Descriptive analysis shows that the distribution of target wealth mirrors
that of cash-on-hand, consistent with the ﬁndings reported in Kennickell and Lusardi
(2004) for the U.S.
The median ratio of target wealth to total wealth is 0.27, and 2.5 if wealth includes
only ﬁnancial assets. These numbers are higher than in Kennickell and Lusardi (2004)
- 0.08 and 0.2 respectively. This shows that in Italy precautionary wealth potentially
accounts for a larger portion of wealth, possibly due to higher income risk and/or
lower degree of development of ﬁnancial and insurance markets. The Italian data
also indicate that in 70 percent of the cases ﬁn a n c i a lw e a l t hi sb e l o wt a r g e t ,a n di n2 7
percent of cases real wealth is below target. Comparable ﬁgures for Kennickell and
Lusardi (2004) are 48 and 17 percent, respectively.
7The SCF question is: “About how much do you think you and your family need to have in
savings for unanticipated emergencies and other unexpected things that may come up?”. As in the
SCF, the question is asked in the wealth and saving section of the questionnaire. The question has
been extensively tested in the SCF with focus groups.
12In the empirical application we measure consumption as non durable expendi-
tures.8 We deﬁne cash-on-hand as Y + Wf + λWr,w h e r eY is household dispos-
able income, Wf and Wr are, respectively, net ﬁnancial assets and real assets, and
0 ≤ λ ≤ 1 measures the portion of real assets that can be used in the current period
to ﬁnance consumption. We focus on a sample where buﬀer stock behavior is more
likely to emerge, selecting household with heads between 20 and 50 years old. The
resulting sample consists of 2,953 observations.
In keeping with the model’s notation, consumption, target wealth, cash-on-hand
and the wealth gap are all normalized by an estimate of permanent income, that is,
income during the working life purged from transitory components. The permanent
component of income is estimated by the ﬁtted value of a regression of household non-
ﬁnancial income on age, education, dummies for occupation, region of residence, head
gender and number of earners in the household. We experiment with other regressions
(for instance, using other sample years, other variables, or interaction terms) and ﬁnd
that the test results are qualitatively unchanged. We therefore opt for a simple and
straightforward deﬁnition. In Section 4.5 we adopt a diﬀerent strategy, relying on
time-averages of income obtained using the panel component of the survey. The
a d v a n t a g ei st h a tt h i sm e a s u r ei sp o t e n t i a l l yc l o s e rt ot h ei n c o m es t o c h a s t i cp r o c e s s
a s s u m e di nS e c t i o n2 .T h ed r a w b a c ki st h a tt h en u m b e ro fo b s e r v a t i o n si sc o n s i d e r a b l e
reduced. In practice, the results appear to be very similar.
Figure 2 plots the histogram of the ratio of target wealth to permanent income.
Median target wealth represents slightly less than one year of income, and the bulk of
the distribution is between 3 months and two years. Table 2 reports sample statistics
for various population groups. The ratio of target wealth to permanent income is
higher for single earners and resident in the North, but overall it is quite stable across
diﬀerent population groups.
8Results are unchanged if one deﬁnes consumption as the sum of non durable and durable ex-
penditures, see Section 4.5.
134 Testing the buﬀer stock model
In this section we estimate the covariance ratio θ. The previous section shows that
realistic values of the parameters of the buﬀer stock model deliver values of θ of at
least 3.6 percent. Simulation analysis with the same parameter values, suggests that
θ in practice is around 30 percent. After presenting full sample estimates, we test if
θ is higher among households that face higher income risk and are therefore expected
to exhibit stronger buﬀer stock behavior. A related issue is that both Deaton’s and
Carroll’s models apply to impatient consumers. Using a direct survey question, we
are able to split the sample by high and low rates of time preference. If one or more
of the relevant variables are measured with error, estimation of (7) provides incorrect
inference. For instance, if xh is measured with error, using (xh − x∗
h) as an instrument
delivers a downward biased estimate of the true θ.9 After presenting our baseline
r e s u l t sa n dt h eg r o u pe s t i m a t e s ,w et h e r e f o re check robustness to measurement error.
Finally, we check the sensitivity of the estimated covariance ratio using diﬀerent
deﬁnitions of income and consumption.
4.1 Baseline estimates
The ﬁrst row of Table 3 displays baseline estimates for the whole sample, obtained
regressing consumption on cash-on-hand, and using the wealth gap as instrument.
In the ﬁrst column, we set λ =1and cash-on-hand is just Y + Wf + Wr,o nt h e
assumption that households can use all assets to buﬀer income shocks. The point
estimate of θ is positive, as predicted by the buﬀer stock model. However, the size
of the coeﬃcient (0.011) is too small to be consistent with the model. And since the
estimate has a small standard error, we formally reject the hypothesis θ =0 .036 (the
lower bound of θ under the null of the buﬀer-stock model), let alone the hypothesis
that θ equals one of the simulated values of Section 2.2. In the other columns we
use diﬀerent deﬁnitions of wealth, obtained setting λ = {0.75,0.50,0.25}, because
transaction costs, illiquidity, and indivisibilities may allow consumers to use only a
9Apart from the unlikely case in which measurement errors in xh and x∗
h cancel each other out.
14portion of their real assets as a buﬀer. We ﬁnd that b θ r a n g e sf r o m1 . 2t o1 . 5p e r c e n t ,
never exceeding the buﬀer stock lowest threshold and therefore failing to support the
model.
4.2 Group estimates
Even if our baseline results do not support it, the buﬀer-stock model might still
characterize the behavior of some population groups that face high income volatility or
are more impatient. We are particularly interested in testing the buﬀer-stock behavior
for groups that, a priori or based on previous evidence, are more likely to exhibit
such behavior. The self-employed clearly face greater income risk than employees. If
the incomes of households with multiple earners are not perfectly correlated, single
income households face more risk than households where both spouses work. The
young might face more income uncertainty, or be more impatient than the middle-
aged because they don’t yet perceive the need to accumulate for old age. In Italian
regions with better functioning credit and insurance markets (the North and the
Centre), employment shocks and other risks are more likely to be insured. And in the
case of education, we have hard evidence with the same dataset that the two groups
face diﬀerent income risks.
To check if buﬀer stock behavior characterizes some population groups, in Ta-
ble 3 we present estimates of θ distinguishing between relatively younger and older
households (age less or greater 40), single and multiple earners, employees and self-
employed, and region of residence. In the ﬁrst column b θ never exceeds 1.5 percent,
conﬁrming the full sample estimates for each of the group considered. Interestingly,
the pattern of coeﬃcients is at variance with priori hypotheses on buﬀer stock be-
havior. The estimated coeﬃcient is lower among the young, the self-employed and
single earners, and in each case the coeﬃcients are precisely estimated and we can
therefore reject the hypothesis that they are equal in the two groups. The estimates
for diﬀerent deﬁnitions of cash-on-hand do not change the pattern of results.
Recent work on the extent of precautionary motive for saving has focussed on busi-
15ness owners. Business owners and entrepreneurs face higher income risk, but their
wealth holdings are also higher than average. Hurst et al. (2005) provide evidence
that tests of precautionary saving are considerably aﬀected by the treatment of en-
trepreneurs. In the total sample, they ﬁnd a strong, positive relation between wealth
and permanent income shocks, as in Carroll and Samwick (1987). But the result is
almost entirely due to business owners: when these are excluded from the sample,
there is hardly evidence for precautionary saving. Table 3 reports b θ distinguishing
by entrepreneurship, deﬁned as positive business wealth. The results are again at
variance with the buﬀer stock model for both groups, as b θ is uniformly lower than
the threshold value for business owners and non-owners. However, in this case the
relative size of the coeﬃcients agrees with expectations, as b θ is generally higher for
business wealth owners (except when λ =1 ).
Comparison of diﬀerent population groups with diﬀerent income generating process
is quite interesting, because in this case we can rely on our previous work using Ital-
ian microeconomic data to estimate the same income process postulated in the buﬀer
stock model and speciﬁed in Section 2. Jappelli and Pistaferri (2006) estimate that
the variance of permanent income shocks is 0.0296 for the less well educated, and
0.0198 for those with at least a high school degree. Carroll and Samwick (1997), us-
ing U.S. data, also ﬁnd that the less well educated face a higher variance of permanent
income shocks. Setting the interest rate at 2.5 percent, the growth rate of earnings
at 1.5 percent and using these group estimates for income volatility, the threshold
(1− G
Rγ) is 3.9 percent for the less well educated and 2.9 percent for households with
higher education. This implies that one should ﬁnd a higher b θ in the ﬁrst group.
The results in Table 4 do not support this hypothesis: in the ﬁrst column, b θ is
1p e r c e n ti nt h eg r o u pw i t hl o w e re d u c a t i o n ,a n d1 . 3p e r c e n ti nt h a tw i t hh i g h e r
education. The results are similar for the other deﬁnitions of cash-on-hand: the data
do not speak in favor of the buﬀer stock model.
164.3 Impatience
The rate of time preference is a critical parameter of models of intertemporal choice,
but microeconomic data seldom allow to pin down particular features of this and other
preference parameters. The 2000 SHIW attempts at providing data on time prefer-
ence through a lottery question. Frederick, Loewenstein, and O’Donoghue (2002)
survey theoretical and empirical research on time preferences, and classify the vari-
ous methods by elicitation methodology (choice, matching, rating or pricing), type of
instrument used to elicit preferences (ﬁeld versus experiment), and time frame (less
than one day to many years). They report that a widely used way to elicit the rate
of time preference is through survey questions asking the respondent to report how
much he or she is willing the pay to receive a lottery winnings today instead of later
in time. The 2000 SHIW has precisely such question: “Suppose that you win euro
5,000, payable for certain in a year’s time. What is the maximum amount that you
are willing to pay to have the euro 5,000 immediately?”.
The question is asked only to half of the sample (household heads born in odd-
numbered years), and about 15 percent don’t answer. The 2000 data can be merged
with 2002 data using the panel component of SHIW (45 percent of the sample). After
merging the data, and considering that in 2002 we focus only on people less than 50
years old, we are left with 498 valid observations with data on both target wealth and
time preference. On average, to cash the lottery one year in advance, respondents
are willing to pay 300,000 lire (about 150 euro), implying a quite standard rate of
time preference of 3 percent a year. Several studies use questions similar to this,
as documented in Frederick, Loewenstein, and O’Donoghue (2002), who also reviews
pros and cons of various methods for eliciting time preference.10
We therefore split the sample according to whether the rate of time preference is
above or below 3 percent. Table 5 reports the estimated θ in the two sub-samples. It
i si m p o r t a n tt ok e e pi nm i n dt h a tt h es a m p l ei nt h i sc a s ei sh i g h l ys e l e c t e d ,a n dt h a t
10Frederick, Loewenstein, and O’Donoghue (2002) emphasize that measurement of time preference
can be aﬀected by confounding factors, such as uncertainty, intertemporal arbitrage and consumption
smoothing.
17we have relatively few observations. Buﬀer stock behavior is rejected in both groups,
as b θ ranges between 1.3 and 1.9 percent. Interestingly, the b θ for the high impatience
group is higher for all measures of cash-on-hand (except λ =0 .25).
4.4 Measurement error
To explore the robustness of our ﬁndings to the possibility that consumption, cash-
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where tilded variables are observed, untilded are true, unobserved values, and εk
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a measurement error in variable k having mean zero. Under the assumptions that
the errors are uncorrelated with each other and with true consumption, cash-on-hand
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11We assume in this section that θc and θx are both positive.
18Measurement error biases downward the OLS coeﬃcient of the regression of con-
sumption on wealth-gap (b θc).12 The bias of the OLS coeﬃcient of the regression of
cash-on-hand on target wealth (b θx) might be either negative or positive. Observing
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where ξ = VA R (εx
h)/V AR(e xh) is the fraction of the total variance of observed cash-
on-hand due to measurement error (see the Appendix for derivations). Condition (11)






(as, say, those estimated in Table 3) may be consistent with buﬀer-stock behavior
if there is enough measurement error in the variables of interest.13 In other words,
the lower bound of the test (the right-hand side of (11)) declines as the variance of
measurement error increases.
Equation (11) can be used to see how large measurement error has to be in order
for the model to be true when the data reject it. Figure 3 plots the right-hand





=0 .036 and estimate the variance
and covariance terms in (11) from the data. The graph shows that in the absence





=0 .036 as assumed thus
far. For ξ ≥ 0.66 the model is falsely rejected due to measurement error. Thus,
if measurement error accounts for at least two-thirds of the observed variability of
cash-on-hand, our results are misleading. Since the reliability index of income and
wealth in the SHIW exceeds 80 percent (Biancotti et al. 2004), it is unlikely that









13This requires VA R(e xh) − COV (e xh, e x∗
h) ≥ 0, i.e., that e xh covaries with itself at least as much
as with e x∗
h.
14Biancotti, D’Alessio and Neri (2004) give extensive account of the quality of the main variables
in SHIW. Exploiting the panel section of the survey, they compute the reliability index for a broad
range of variables. The index is the fraction of total variability of the measured characteristic
accounted by its true variability.
19deﬁnitions of wealth or estimates splitting the sample by socioeconomic groups.
4.5 Further sensitivity checks
Our measure of permanent income, which we use to normalize cash-on-hand, con-
sumption, and target wealth, is obtained through cross-sectional regressions, and may
not be purged from transitory components. In Table 6 we report the estimated co-
variance ratio using an alternative measure, obtained averaging household disposable
income (net of ﬁnancial income) over time. This measure can only be computed for
households in the 2000-02 panel section of SHIW. Averaging should remove compo-
nents that are purely transitory and mean-reverting. The results are similar, although
the estimate of θ is less precise due to the reduced number of observations.
So far, our tests have been conducted deﬁning consumption as non-durable expen-
diture. SHIW has also data on expenditures on durable goods, and therefore we can
use total expenditure as an alternative measure of consumption. As a further sensi-
tivity check, we exclude ﬁnancial income from the deﬁnition of income and ﬁnd that
t h er e s u l t sa r en o ta ﬀected, as shown in Table 6. The results are our also unchanged
if one exclude housing wealth from total wealth.
5 The wealth-income ratio of young households
The version of the buﬀer stock model that we analyze is one with impatient con-
sumers, uncertainty about future earnings, and no borrowing constraints. If such
consumers are suﬃciently prudent and expect their earnings to grow over time, they
will never borrow and keep their consumption within their current incomes, thus in-
ducing “tracking” between consumption and income. In other versions of the buﬀer
stock model, impatient consumers would like to borrow but are prevented to do so
because of credit market imperfections, as in Deaton (1991). The implications for
the behavior of consumption and wealth are similar, however, and “consumption is
smoothed, not over the whole life-cycle, but over much shorter periods of a few years at
a time” (Deaton, 2005). In the literature, this is often referred to as “high-frequency”
20smoothing of income, as opposed to the “low-frequency” or “life-cycle frequency”
smoothing that was postulated by Modigliani and Brumberg.
Tracking of income and consumption and buﬀer stock behavior stand in sharp
contrast with one of the most important implications of the Life-Cycle Hypothesis,
according to which young people save for post-retirement expenditures, and accumu-
late wealth up to retirement. In the certainty version the model, the wealth-income
ratio increases during the working span, target wealth-income ratio is reached at re-
tirement age, and the consumption and income proﬁles are completely detached. If
income is expected to increase over the working life, consumers borrow early in life,
and start accumulating wealth only when debt is repaid, which might be even after
several years of work, depending on preferences and the growth rate of individual
incomes (Hubbard and Judd, 1986).
In a more sophisticated version of the life-cycle model with income risk and life
uncertainty, Hubbard, Skinner and Zeldes (1995) show that suﬃciently patient con-
sumers save even earlier in life. In these life-cycle models with income risk, uncertainty
generates a demand for precautionary saving during the working span. But, as noted
by Modigliani (1986), accumulated assets can serve the double purpose of providing
resources for retirement and a buﬀer against unexpected emergencies.
Gourinchas and Parker (2002) results fall in between these two polar cases. They
estimate that the behavior of young consumers exhibits buﬀer stock behavior, at least
in the U.S. These consumers would like to borrow but cannot, or are too prudent to
borrow. One way or another, their consumption tracks income closely and the wealth-
income ratio is approximately constant. Once consumers reach middle-age, however,
they follow the standard life-cycle model and the wealth-income ratio increases until
retirement. Carroll’s (1997) simulations of age proﬁle of the wealth-income ratio is
indeed consistent with these ﬁndings. Similar tracking of income and consumption
arises in models with hyperbolic discounting, see Laibson, Repetto and Tobacman
(1998).15 The age proﬁle of the wealth-income ratio of young and middle-aged con-
15The composition of wealth, however, diﬀers between models with exponential and hyperbolic
21sumers provides therefore a useful avenue to distinguish diﬀerent classes of models of
intertemporal choice.
In the previous section we establish that Italian wealth data are at variance with
the buﬀer stock model. Even though we select a sample where buﬀer stock behavior is
most likely to arise (individuals aged 20 to 50, or individuals with relatively high rates
of time preference), we do not ﬁnd evidence that deviations of wealth from target
are oﬀset by changes in consumption. What then explains the saving decisions of
young households? Here we attempt to discriminate between diﬀerent saving models
providing evidence on the saving behavior of young consumers and estimating their
age-wealth proﬁles.
A single cross-section is not suitable to the purpose of estimating age-proﬁles,
since in a given year age is perfectly collinear with year of birth (Shorrocks, 1975).
The individuals interviewed in any cross-section belong to generations that diﬀer
in productivity, mortality, preferences, and economic environment. For instance,
someone who entered the labor force in the sixties experienced diﬀerent productivity
growth and might have diﬀerent preferences than an individual born in the eighties
and just now entering the labor force. Thus, a ﬁnding that the wealth-income ratio
increases changes with age in a cross-section may tell very little about households’
behavior.
With panel data or repeated cross-sectional data one, can recover age eﬀects under
suitable identiﬁcation assumptions. Panel data allow the econometrician to track
individual wealth trajectories over time. When long panels with wealth data are not
available, repeated cross-sectional data can partly overcome their absence. Although
the same individual is only observed once, a sample from the same cohort is observed
in a later survey, so that one can track the wealth not of the same individual, but of
a representative sample of individuals of the same cohort.
We use income and wealth data from seven surveys (1989, 1991, 1993, 1995,
discounting, because hyperbolic consumers hold a smaller share of assets in liquid form, see Angeletos
et al. (2001).
221998, 2000 and 2002), a total of almost 60,000 households.16 Income is deﬁned as
household disposable income, net of ﬁnancial income. To account for the fact that
some of the wealth is illiquid and cannot be used for precautionary purposes, we use
two deﬁnitions of wealth, total assets and net ﬁnancial assets.
We use the repeated cross-sections to sort the data by the year of birth of the
head of the household. The ﬁrst cohort includes all households whose head was born
in 1939 (50 years old in 1989, the ﬁrst year of the sample). The second includes those
born in 1940, and so on up to the last cohort, which includes those born in 1980 (22
years old in 2002, the last year). As with other survey data, the wealth distribution
is skewed. We report only results for the average wealth-income ratio; results for the
median ratio are similar and are not reported for brevity.
T h el e f tg r a p h si nF i g u r e4o ﬀers important insights into the process of wealth
accumulation of young Italian households. To make the graphs more readable, we plot
only the wealth-income ratio and the ﬁnancial wealth-income ratio of four selected
cohorts. The numbers in the graph refer to the year of birth, extending from 50
(individuals born in 1950) to 65 (individuals born in 1965). Except for the youngest
and the oldest generations, each cohort is observed at seven diﬀerent points in times,
one for each cross-section. The cross-sections run from 1989 to 2002. Thus, each
generation is observed for 13 years with each line being broken (for instance, cohort
60 is sampled 7 times from age 29 in 1989 to age 42 in 2002). Both ratios are
potentially aﬀected by age, cohort and time eﬀects.17
To estimate the age proﬁle of the wealth-income ratio, one can proceed as Deaton
and Paxson (1994), regressing the wealth-income ratio on age dummies, cohort dum-
mies, and restricted year dummies, summing to zero and orthogonal to a time trend.
An alternative identiﬁcation assumption is to express the ratio as a function of age
16In the SHIW households are deﬁned to include all persons residing in the same dwelling who
are related by blood, marriage or adoption. Individuals selected as “partners or other common-law
relationships” are also treated as families.
17Two macroeconomic episodes characterize our sample period. The economy went into a recession
in 1991-93. Afterwards the economy began a mild recovery, with the growth rate picking up in 2000,
and falling in 2002.
23dummies and unrestricted time dummies (eliminating cohorts eﬀects). This alter-
native decomposition delivers, qualitative similar results, e.g., an increasing wealth-
income ratio. Both normalizations rule out time-age or time-cohort interaction terms
The wealth-income equation is estimated on 203 age/year/cohort cells. Given the
structure of our sample, the regressors include 28 age dummies (from age 22 to age
50), 41 cohort dummies (from 1939 to 1980), a set of restricted time dummies, and a
constant term. Under the assumptions described above, the estimated age dummies
can be interpreted as an individual age-wealth proﬁle, purged from cohort eﬀects.
The right-hand-side of Figure 4 plots the estimated age dummies, separately for
the total wealth and ﬁnancial wealth-income ratios. Both ratios increase with age.
B e t w e e na g e2 0a n d5 0t h e r ei sas i x - f o l di n c r e a s ei nt h ew e a l t h - i n c o m er a t i o( f r o m1
to 6), and a three-fold increase in the ﬁnancial wealth-income ratio (from 0.4 to 1.2).
Since wealth accumulation may depend also on other characteristics (household
size and composition, rules governing retirement, education, gender, region of resi-
dence) we estimate an extended speciﬁcation on the repeated cross-.sectional data.
We also exclude households with heads less than 30 years old, to account for the fact
that young working adults with independent living arrangements tend to be wealthier
than average, aﬀecting the age-wealth proﬁle. In both cases the qualitative results of
increasing age-wealth proﬁle in Figure 4 is unchanged. Overall, the evidence suggests
that models in which consumption and income of young households track each other
closely are not an adequate description of the behavior of Italian households. Rather,
consumers start saving early in life, and accumulate assets at the rate of around 15
percent of their income, or euro 5,000 euro per year.
6C o n c l u s i o n s
Intertemporal models with liquidity constraints, income risk, and impatience empha-
size that consumers use savings to buﬀer income ﬂuctuations. These models deliver
a stationary distribution of the ratio of target wealth to permanent income. When
actual wealth, relative to income, is below the optimal target, consumers try to in-
24crease their saving. When wealth is above target, they increase consumption. This
important implication of the buﬀer stock model has not been subject to direct empir-
ical testing. We derive from the model an appropriate theoretical restriction and test
it using data drawn from the 2002 Italian Survey of Household Income and Wealth.
One of the most appealing features of the survey is that people report the amount
of wealth held for precautionary purposes, which we interpret as target wealth in
the buﬀer stock model. The test results do not support buﬀer stock behavior, even
among population groups that are more likely, a priori, to display such behavior (the
young and the self-employed). Measurement error in target wealth or consumption
is unlikely to explain the model’s failure. The age-wealth proﬁle of young households
provides further indirect evidence against buﬀer stock behavior.
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29A Appendix
For simplicity, we assume θc > 0 and θx > 0 throughout. We also assume that
consumption, cash-on-hand and target wealth are all measured with error:
e ch = ch + ε
c
h










where tilded variables are observed, untilded are the true, unobserved values, and εk
h
is a classical measurement error in variable k, with mean zero. Under the assumptions
that the errors are uncorrelated with each other and with true consumption, cash-on-
hand and target wealth, the probability limit of the OLS coeﬃcient in the regression
of e ch on e xh − e x∗
h (b θc)i s :
θc
VA R (xh − x∗
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The probability limit of the OLS coeﬃcient in the regression of e xh on e xh−e x∗
h (b θx)
is given by:
θxVA R (xh − x∗
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where ξ = VA R (εx
h)/V AR(e xh) is the fraction of the observed variance of cash-on-
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Selected Statistics for Target Wealth
Mean First quartile Median Third quartile # obs.
Total sample 49,990 10,000 25,000 50,000 2,953
Age<40 48,133 10,000 20,000 50,000 1,417
Age≥40 52,003 10,000 25,000 50,000 1,536
Low education 41,567 8,000 20,000 50,000 1,377
High education 57,993 10,000 25,000 50,000 1,576
Self-employed 59,220 10,000 30,000 75,000 567
Employee 47,844 10,000 25,000 50,000 2,386
Single earner 45,094 5,000 20,000 50,000 1,309
Multiple earners 54,616 10,000 25,000 50,000 1,644
North-Center 57,765 10,000 25,000 50,000 1,984
South 32,541 5,000 12,000 40,000 969
Entrepreneurs 59,044 10,000 30,000 60,000 548
Non-entrepreneurs 47,987 10,000 20,000 50,000 2,405
Note. Sample statistics are estimated with population weights.
32Table 2
Selected Statistics for the Ratio of Target Wealth to Permanent Income
Mean First quartile Median
Total sample 2.126 0.346 0.994
Age<40 2.197 0.327 0.994
Age≥40 2.049 0.360 0.989
Low education 2.134 0.364 1.030
High education 2.117 0.321 0.936
Self-employed 2.067 0.330 1.031
Employee 2.139 0.348 0.989
Single earner 2.528 0.380 1.171
Multiple earners 1.745 0.330 0.851
North-Center 2.249 0.412 1.073
Note. Sample statistics are estimated with population weights.
33Table 3
Testing Buﬀer-Stock Behavior: Baseline Regression and Group Estimates
Y + Wr + Wf Y +0 .75Wr + Wf Y +0 .5Wr + Wf Y +0 .25Wr + Wf
Total Sample 0.011 0.013 0.015 0.012
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Age<40 0.008 0.009 0.010 0.006
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.004)
Age≥40 0.012 0.014 0.016 0.014
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Self-employed 0.009 0.011 0.015 0.018
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003)
Employee 0.015 0.016 0.016 0.011
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Single earner 0.011 0.013 0.014 0.012
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003)
Multiple earners 0.013 0.016 0.019 0.021
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003)
North-Center 0.012 0.015 0.019 0.022
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003)
South 0.010 0.010 0.009 0.005
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Entrepreneurs 0.011 0.014 0.019 0.026
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003)
Non-entrepreneurs 0.012 0.013 0.011 0.006
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Note. Wr and Wf are, respectively, real and ﬁnancial wealth, and Y is disposable
income. Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
34Table 4
Testing Buﬀer-Stock Behavior: Sample Splits by Education
Y + Wr + Wf Y +0 .75Wr + Wf Y +0 .5Wr + Wf Y +0 .25Wr + Wf
Low education 0.010 0.012 0.016 0.018
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005)
High education 0.013 0.014 0.015 0.011
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Note. Wr and Wf are, respectively, real and ﬁnancial wealth, and Y is disposable
income. Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
35Table 5
Testing Buﬀe r - S t o c kB e h a v i o r :S a m p l eS p l i t sb yR a t eo fT i m eP r e f e r e n c e
Y + Wr + Wf Y +0 .75Wr + Wf Y +0 .5Wr + Wf Y +0 .25Wr + Wf
High impatience 0.013 0.016 0.019 0.019
(0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.009)
Low impatience 0.008 0.010 0.014 0.019
(0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.007)
Note. Wr and Wf are, respectively, real and ﬁnancial wealth, and Y is disposable
income. Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
36Table 6
Testing Buﬀer-Stock Behavior: Sensitivity Checks
Y + Wr + Wf Y +0 .75Wr + Wf Y +0 .5Wr + Wf Y +0 .25Wr + Wf
2000-2002 panel 0.002 -0.001 -0.007 -0.016
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004)
1998-2002 panel 0.002 -0.004 -0.026 -0.140
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.020)
Consumption 0.013 0.015 0.016 0.013
includes durables (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Cash-on-hand excludes 0.011 0.013 0.015 0.012
ﬁnancial income (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Cash-on-hand excludes 0.005 0.005 0.004 0.002
housing wealth (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Note. Wr and Wf are, respectively, real and ﬁnancial wealth, and Y is disposable
income. Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
37Figure 1: Simulated consumption and income
































Note. The ﬁgure plots the ratio of consumption and income to permanent income
for a buﬀer stock consumer under the baseline parameter values.
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Note. The ﬁgure plots the lower bound of θ under the buﬀer stock model as a
function of the fraction of the observed variance in cash-on-hand due to measurement
error.































Variance due to meas. error

































































































































































































Note. The upper graphs report the wealth-income ratio and the ﬁnancial-wealth
income ratio of selected cohorts between 1989 and 2002. The graphs on the right
report the age proﬁles of the two variables estimated with the repeated cross-sectional
data. Source: Bank of Italy Survey of Household Income and Wealth.
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